CVE-2026-42768: Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()
- Is it exploited?
Not on CISA's list. CISA has not added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of . If CISA adds it, this page shows it as known exploited.
- How likely is exploitation in the next 30 days?
- 0.8%
EPSS score, percentile 56.5 of all scored records. A probability estimated by FIRST, not a report of exploitation.
- How severe?
- 3.7 Low
CVSS v3.1 base score, from CISA's enrichment of the record
- What should I do?
CISA has set no required action, because the vulnerability is not in KEV.
- Which versions are affected?
Affected
- from 4.0.0 to before 4.0.1
- from 3.6.0 to before 3.6.3
- from 3.5.0 to before 3.5.7
- from 3.4.0 to before 3.4.6
Source: CISA KEV 2026.10.29, as of ; FIRST EPSS, as of ; CVE List, as of . About the data.
What to do
Advisories and patches
This summary is based on the CVE record as of . Check the vendor's advisory before you act: affected versions and fixes can change.
Affected products and versions
As listed in the CVE record.
| Status | Versions |
|---|---|
| Affected | from 4.0.0 to before 4.0.1 |
| Affected | from 3.6.0 to before 3.6.3 |
| Affected | from 3.5.0 to before 3.5.7 |
| Affected | from 3.4.0 to before 3.4.6 |
Versions not listed are: unaffected.
Source: CVE List, as of . About the data.
About this vulnerability
Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA…
Summary: CVE record, as of .
- CISA has not added CVE-2026-42768 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, as of 29 Oct 2026.
- The CVE record was published on 9 Jun 2026.
- The CVE record carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.7 (Low), taken from CISA's enrichment of the record.
- FIRST's EPSS model puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.8% (percentile 56.5), as of 29 Oct 2026. EPSS is a statistical estimate, not a report of exploitation.
- CISA's SSVC assessment in the CVE record: exploitation none, automatable no, technical impact partial.
- The credits in the CVE record name Anthropic (Claude) as finder.
Source: CISA KEV 2026.10.29, as of ; CVE List, as of ; FIRST EPSS, as of . About the data.
Description
Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()
Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA key. The attack is possible in 2 variants. 1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success. An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is available. That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under it. 2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random key is substituted. An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle. We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this CVE has been evaluated as Low severity. To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit rejection was explicitly disabled. The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value, the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for decryption. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Source: CVE List, as of . About the data.
Weakness
CWE-514
- CWE-514: Covert Channel
CWE and CAPEC are maintained by MITRE; the entries are those named in the CVE record.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| CVE record published | |
| CVE record last updated |
Known exploited OpenSSL vulnerabilities
- CVE-2014-0160: OpenSSL Information Disclosure Vulnerability