CVE-2026-94418: Signature failure masked by date error under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY

Is it exploited?

Not on CISA's list. CISA has not added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of 29 Oct 2026. If CISA adds it, this page shows it as known exploited.

How likely is exploitation in the next 30 days?

0.1%

Up from <0.1% on 22 Oct 2026.

EPSS score, percentile 1.1 of all scored records. A probability estimated by FIRST, not a report of exploitation.

How severe?

2.3 Low

CVSS v4.0 base score, given by the CNA

What should I do?

CISA has set no required action, because the vulnerability is not in KEV.

The CVE record links no vendor advisory, patch or mitigation.

Which versions are affected?

Affected

• 3.15.5 through 5.9.2

Versions by product

Source: CISA KEV 2026.10.29, as of 29 Oct 2026; FIRST EPSS, as of 29 Oct 2026; CVE List, as of 29 Oct 2026. About the data.

What to do

Advisories and patches

The CVE record links no vendor advisory, patch or mitigation.

This summary is based on the CVE record as of 29 Oct 2026. Check the vendor's advisory before you act: affected versions and fixes can change.

Affected products and versions

As listed in the CVE record.

Versions not listed are: unaffected.

Source: CVE List, as of 29 Oct 2026. About the data.

About this vulnerability

Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has…

Summary: CVE record, as of 29 Oct 2026.

• CISA has not added CVE-2026-94418 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, as of 29 Oct 2026.
• The CVE record was published on 27 Sep 2026.
• The CVE record carries a CVSS v4.0 base score of 2.3 (Low), given by its CNA.
• FIRST's EPSS model puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.1% (percentile 1.1), as of 29 Oct 2026. EPSS is a statistical estimate, not a report of exploitation.
• CISA's SSVC assessment in the CVE record: exploitation none, automatable no, technical impact partial.
• The credits in the CVE record name Anthropic (Claude) as finder.

Source: CISA KEV 2026.10.29, as of 29 Oct 2026; CVE List, as of 29 Oct 2026; FIRST EPSS, as of 29 Oct 2026. About the data.

Description

Signature failure masked by date error under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY

Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes "override date errors" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN_BEFORE_DATE_E or ASN_AFTER_DATE_E; wolfSSL ships this exact shape as myVerify() in wolfssl/test.h under VERIFY_OVERRIDE_DATE_ERR, which examples/client -D selects. An application with no callback, or whose callback returns preverify for date errors, still fails the handshake, and wolfSSL_CertManagerVerifyBuffer() and wc_CheckCertSignature() report ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E correctly in the same binary. TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 are affected in both directions, and DTLS reaches the same function; where the forged certificate is a chain certificate the callback's consent causes it to be cached in the WOLFSSL_CTX certificate manager, so an exposed deployment must restart the context or the process rather than merely reconnect.

Source: CVE List, as of 29 Oct 2026. About the data.

Timeline